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Abstract The present study explores to what extent Asian
elephants show “means–end” behavior. We used captive
Asian elephants (N = 2) to conduct four variations of the
Piagetian “support” problem, which involves a goal object
that is out of reach, but rests on a support within reach. In
the Wrst condition, elephants were simultaneously presented
with two identical trays serving as the “support”, with the
bait on one tray and the other tray left empty. In the next
two conditions, the bait was placed on one tray, while addi-
tional bait was placed beside the other tray. In the last con-
dition, both trays contained bait, but one of the trays had a
small gap which prevented the elephants from reaching the
reward. Subjects were required to choose and pull either
tray with their trunk and to obtain the bait (i.e. goal).
Results showed that one elephant performed all of the sup-
port problems signiWcantly above chance after several ses-
sions, suggesting that the elephant was capable of
understanding that pulling the tray was the “means” for
achieving the “end” of obtaining the bait. This study
showed that elephants show means–end behavior when
subjected to a Piagetian “support” task, and indicates that
such goal-directed behavior occurs in species other than
primates.
Keywords Asian elephant · Piaget · Means–end problem
Introduction
Elephants are widely believed to be highly intelligent.
Across several countries, elephants have been trained and
tamed for public show and labor. Furthermore, elephants
easily learn to understand various sorts of commands that
are verbally expressed by circus trainers and jungle dwell-
ers (e.g. Rensch 1956, 1957). 
Although there is much anecdotal evidence that ele-
phants appear to be intelligent, empirical investigations are
scarce. One seminal study examined to what extent Asian
elephants possess the ability to memorize sets of arbitrary
drawings (Rensch 1957). In that study a young female ele-
phant was presented with a pair of drawings and then
required to choose the drawing that had been arbitrarily
predetermined to be the “correct” one. After several train-
ing sessions (330 trials in total), she had learnt to choose
the correct drawing. When diVerent pairs of drawings were
presented, the elephant learned the discrimination more and
more rapidly (within 10 trials by the fourth pair), and could
select them even after 1 year. The excellent memory perfor-
mance of elephants was also described in a diVerent study.
McComb et al. (2000) showed that an African elephant rec-
ognized the low-frequency contact calls of herd members
who had died 23 months before, and even of individual
who had left the herd 12 years earlier. 
Other evidence of elephant intelligence is their capacity
to use tools skillfully. Hart et al. (2001) observed that wild
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and captive Asian elephants use sticks as tools to fend oV
Xies and to scratch their own bodies (e.g. Hart and Hart
1994). Moreover, they reported that elephants sometimes
modify sticks by breaking them in half when they are too
long or by taking leaves oV branches when they are too leafy
(Hart and Hart 1994). Because it was long believed that only
a few species such as chimpanzees and crows spontaneously
use tools in the wild (e.g. Gould and Gould 1994; Vauclair
1996), the elephants’ ability to use tools seems intriguing in
terms of theoretical arguments about animal intelligence. 
As noted above, elephants appear to possess high-level
cognitive abilities in various situations. Their intelligence
potential is also supported by their anatomical and physio-
logical features. Elephants, especially Asian elephants (Ele-
phas maximus), have the largest brain of all terrestrial
species (approximately 5,000 g). Moreover, their encepha-
lization quotient (EQ), i.e. the ratio of cortex to body size,
is high (2.30, compared to 2.49 for chimpanzees and 7.44
for humans, e.g. Jerison (1974)). According to theoretical
arguments, such a large brain is likely related to high cogni-
tive performance (Jerison 1974). However, Nissani (2006)
recently reported the poor performance of elephants when
given a causal reasoning task. In the task, the elephants
were to simply remove the lid oV a bucket to earn the bait
inside, but some elephants still removed the lid when the lid
was placed on the ground therefore unrelated to the goal of
obtaining the bait inside the bucket. Author concluded ele-
phants did not form a causal model, in which the lid is per-
ceived as an obstacle to food underneath it. However, as the
author himself points out, it is possible that the results
speak more to the rigidity of elephants’ learned behavior to
their lack of causal reasoning. Hart et al. (2007) argue that
less-densely packed and larger elephants’ cortical nonso-
matic neurons may give an account of their better perfor-
mance in long-term extensive memory but rather poor
performance in conventional test of cognitive performance
such as causal reasoning tasks.
Furthermore, elephants are unique in terms of possessing
a prehensile trunk. The trunk makes it possible to manipu-
late easily various types of objects, even objects as small as
a straw from a Xoor. Thus, in some way an elephant’s trunk
may be comparable to the skillful hands of primates.
In the present study, we examined whether Asian ele-
phants show means–end behavior. We used a Piagetian
“support” task, in which this speciWc kind of problem-solv-
ing skill is assessed. Piaget (1952) Wrst used the support
task to investigate whether human infants are able to under-
stand means–end relationships. He developed a task in
which the infant must try to obtain a toy that is out of direct
reach by pulling a towel placed underneath the toy toward
itself. In this task, the towel serves as a support and apply-
ing the support in the correct way is the means to accom-
plish the end of obtaining the toy. Human infants of around
11 months of age have acquired the ability to complete the
task, which indicates that they possess conceptual knowl-
edge about the relationship between the means and the end,
the spatial relationship between the two, and the features of
the material serving as a support. Moreover, it indicates the
development of cognitive processing that allows subjects to
have a deWnite goal, to persist in attempting to achieve it,
and to produce a goal-directed behavior. Similar cognitive
steps are required for tool-use behavior. Thus, this task may
also serve to assess tool-using ability. Subsequent studies
have developed the support task to examine in more detail
the development of means–end understanding in early
infancy (e.g. Willatts 1984, 1990, 1999).
Previous studies have reported that nonhuman primates
such as New World monkeys and chimpanzees are capable
of understanding a means–end relationship in a variety of
experimental tasks (Hauser et al. 2002, 1999; Povinelli et al.
2000). Cotton-top tamarins, for example, have been shown
to perform the support task well in a laboratory setting
(Hauser et al. 2002). Tamarins were to choose between a
board on which bait was placed and thus served as a support
when drawn closer and the other board to which bait was
placed next and thus would not serve as a support. Hauser
et al. (1999) also tested whether the tamarins would general-
ize to changes in the irrelevant features of the support, such
as the shape, size, and color, which they succeeded. More-
over, the tamarins were able to reach the criterion (attain an
accuracy of 90% on two consecutive sessions) within 260
trials in the on–oV problem tasks (Hauser et al. 2002). In
another study with tamarins, they were able to learn to earn
baits involving two tools in combination, though they do so
only with suYcient training (Santos et al. 2005).
Other studies had investigated the ability in other mam-
mals and birds. For instance, Halsey et al. (2006) showed
wild common marmosets were able to solve the parallel
string task, in which one of the two strings was attached to
bait, and subjects were to select the attached string to earn
the bait, under natural condition. Osthaus et al. (2005)
showed that unlike apes, dogs are able to learn to pull on a
string to earn the attached bait but they do not solve the task
by virtue of understanding the means–end relationship.
Pigeons were able to learn the discrimination of two ribbon/
dish assemblies, in which pulling the ribbon allowed
pigeons to retrieve the dish full of baits (Schmidt and Cook
2006). However, their results did not indicate the evidence
of comprehension of conceptual nature of connectedness.
In another study, Heinrich and Bugnyar (2005) showed that
ravens were able to pull on a string to retrieve the attached
meat, and they did this without initial training.
In the present study we investigated the cognitive ability
of Asian elephants by testing their capacity for showing
means–end behavior when subjected to a Piagetian “sup-
port” task. They were given a means–end task, modeledAnim Cogn (2008) 11:359–365 361
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after the Hauser et al.’s (1999) study on cotton-top tama-
rins, and were given two alternatives of identical boards, in
which one of them would serve as a support to bring baits
into their reach.
Methods
Subjects and housing
Data were collected from two female captive Asian ele-
phants (E. maximus), Authai (aged 6 years) and Surya
(aged 10 years), which were born in Thailand and India,
respectively. They were raised by humans in peer groups
during infancy and then moved into the Ueno Zoological
Park in Tokyo, Japan. They were housed together for
3 years in adjacent home cages (6.5 m £ 6 m) with an older
female (27 years old). Each home cage was connected to a
larger outside enclosure (approximately 35 m £ 40 m),
where the elephants played together in the daytime. Thus,
they had considerable physical, vocal, and tactile contact
with conspeciWcs. All facilities were approved by the Japa-
nese Association of Zoos and Aquariums, and the housing
was based on the Guidelines for the Management of Asian
Elephants in Japan.
The elephants were managed in a free-contact way,
ensuring that a zookeeper had free access to the enclosure,
managed them, kept their bodies clean, and sometimes
trained them to obey some types of vocal command (“go”,
“wait”, “sit down”, etc.). However, they were not trained to
perform in show for the public. The elephants were fed four
times a day, 8:00, 11:00, 13:00 and 16:00, on a diet of hay,
soilage, and fruits (sometimes a vitamin supplement). They
were taken outside before the Wrst meal (8:00), and into the
home cage before the last meal (16:00). They had free
access to water at all times.
A series of experiments were carried out in an outside
playground (as described below in detail) before the second
meal (11:00) and/or the third meal (13:00), but not on rainy
days, when the elephants would remain inside the home
cage all day. The elephant performing in the task was out of
view of the other elephant and the order of testing was ran-
domly selected each day. Weights were not especially
maintained for the present experiment. The weights (§SD)
of Authai and Surya were approximately 1,720 (§20) and
2,400 (§40) kg, respectively, during the experiments. The
elephants had no prior experience with any of the experi-
mental tasks.
Procedure
Prior to testing, we assessed whether the elephants were
able to grab and pull a target tray with the tip of their trunk.
The experimenter stood in front of each subject and placed
a cardboard tray (25 cm £ 44 cm £ 6 cm) approximately
100–120 cm away from the enclosure. The tray had an
extension (10 cm £ 20 cm £ 6 cm) with a handle that
could be easily grabbed The subjects spontaneously
approached, grabbed, pulled, and played with the tray for
several minutes. Following the habituation phase, the ele-
phants were subjected to the experimental trials described
below.
The general procedure of the experimental trials was as
follows: a zookeeper Wrst brought the elephant to a small
outside playground (6.2 m £ 6.5 m) between the home
cage and the larger outside enclosure. This playground was
surrounded by rocks, so that it was not in view of zoo visi-
tors. Within the playground there was an automatic up-and-
down gate (195 cm wide). During testing, the gate was kept
open and the left and right sides of the opening were con-
nected with a chain at 1 m height, preventing the elephants
from leaving the playground. However, the elephants could
reach underneath the chain with their trunks (Fig. 1).
The experimenter stood in front of the gate on the other
side of the chain and placed a set of cardboard trays
(25 cm £ 44 cm £ 6 cm) approximately 100–120 cm away
from the gate. The two trays were always placed side by
side, approximately 50 cm apart. For each experimental
trial, the bait (a piece of apple, banana, or watermelon) was
placed on or oV the trays (for details see below). A 6-cm-
high ridge surrounded each of the trays to prevent the bait
from falling out. Because the bait was never directly within
reach of the elephants’ trunks, they had to grab and pull the
tray toward them in order to obtain the bait.
Each trial was initiated when the zookeeper stopped the
subject approximately 3.5 m away from the gate, facing the
trays. The zookeeper then gave the elephant a vocal com-
mand (i.e., “go”). As soon as the elephant started to walk
Fig. 1 Surya performing in Condition B. Subjects had to grab the han-
dle and pull the tray closer using their trunk362 Anim Cogn (2008) 11:359–365
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toward the tray, the zookeeper turned his back to the ele-
phant to avoid providing any sort of cue. After obtaining
the bait, the elephant was pulled away from the gate by the
zookeeper. The zookeeper would conWscate the tray from
the elephant if she kept grabbing and playing with the tray.
While the elephant was away from the gate with the zoo-
keeper, the experimenter recorded the result of previous
trial then set up the next trial out of the elephant’s sight.
The experimenter stood at least 2 m away from the setting
and the elephant facing back and did not face the elephant
until the zookeeper pulled the elephant away.
Experimental conditions
There were four experimental conditions A, B, C, and D. In
all conditions the elephants’ task was to choose a tray, pull
it toward itself, and obtain the bait. A trial was considered
“correct” when an elephant chose the tray on which the bait
was placed, and retrieved the bait. The correct tray was
placed on the right in half of trials and on the left in the
other half within a session and the order was random. Both
subjects underwent ten successive trials of a single condi-
tion on one day (one block).
We Wrst presented the elephants with Condition A, the
training condition. Although the signiWcance of performance
was predetermined 66% correct, the elephants were given
the same condition trials until their performance met the pre-
determined criterion, i.e. above 75% correct in one condition
(38/50 trials, binomial test: P = 0.0003, two-tailed), then the
elephant proceeded to the next condition, and so forth, in
alphabetical order (A–B–C–D). Detailed materials and pro-
cedure of each condition are described below.
Condition A. Ten trials per day were provided to Authai
and Surya for 10 and 5 days, respectively. Two identical
blue-colored cardboard trays were placed in front of the
elephant on the opposite side of the chain. In each trial, the
bait was placed randomly on either of the two trays
(Fig. 2a). On the Wrst 5 days, the subjects were allowed to
pull the trays as many times as necessary until they
obtained the bait. On the second 5 days, the subject (only
Authai) was allowed to pull the tray only once per trial, and
therefore would not obtain the bait if she chose the incor-
rect tray. The latter procedure was conducted so that Authai
would learn that she has only one chance per trial and
would not earn bait unless she makes the right choice on
her Wrst selection. Surya was not given the second 5-day
training sessions because she spontaneously pulled only
one tray in her Wrst 5-day training session. The correct per-
formance was deWned pulling the baited tray on their Wrst
choice for both Wrst and second 5-day training sessions.
Condition B. Ten trials per day were provided to Authai
and Surya for 15 and 25 days, respectively. The second task
is also referred to as the “on–oV” task, in which the bait was
“on” one tray, and the bait was “oV”, i.e. lying beside, the
other tray (Fig. 2b). Thus, the elephants could access the
bait by pulling the tray containing the food, but pulling
other tray did not result in such a reward. The trays were
the same as those used in Condition A. The subject was
allowed to pull the tray only once per trial.
Condition C. Ten trials per day were provided to each
elephant for 10 days. The third task was a transfer test that
can be considered as a variation on the “on–oV” task to test
whether the elephants are able to make distinction between
the relevant and irrelevant features of the problem (Fig. 2c).
Fig. 2 Trays used in 
Condition A (a), Condition B 
(b), Condition C (c), and 
Condition D (d). Trays were col-
ored blue in Conditions A and B, 
green in Condition C, and black 
in Condition DAnim Cogn (2008) 11:359–365 363
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Thus, the task was identical to that of Condition B, except
for two irrelevant features: the color of the trays (green
instead of blue) and their size (55 cm £ 44 cm).
Condition D. Ten trials per day were provided to Authai
for 15 days. This Wnal task is also referred to as the “con-
nectedness” task, in which the elephant had to choose
between a bait placed on a single, uninterrupted black-col-
ored tray (50 cm £ 44 cm) and a bait placed on a black-col-
ored tray with a horizontal gap (approximately 15 cm) in
the middle (lower tray, 15 cm £ 44 cm with a handle;
upper tray, 20 cm £ 44 cm)(Fig. 2d). The uninterrupted
tray was the “correct” choice in this condition, as pulling
the other tray would not result in obtaining the bait.
Results
Figure 3 depicts the percentage of correct trials per block
(i.e. 50 trials) across all conditions. SigniWcant performance
was set at a score >66% correct (33 of 50 trials; binomial
test, P = 0.0328). The results for the four conditions sepa-
rately are as follows: 
Condition A. Both elephants performed the task signiW-
cantly better than the chance in the Wrst block (the Wrst
5 days): Authai performed 66% of trials correctly
(binomial test: P = 0.0328), while Surya completed
80% of trials correctly (binomial test: P < 0.0001) and
thus had reached the criterion in the Wrst block. Authai
reached the criterion in the second block (84% of trials
correct, binomial test: P < 0.0001). These Wndings indi-
cate that the elephants were able to learn that pulling
the tray containing the bait enabled them to retrieve the
food, whereas pulling the empty tray did not result in
such a reward. See Fig. 4a to see the details of the sub-
jects’ early performance.
Condition B. Both subjects required more than two
blocks to reach criterion in this task (Authai: 80% cor-
rect at the third block, binomial test, P < 0.0001;
Surya: 80% correct at the Wfth block, binomial test,
P < 0.0001). These results indicate that the elephants
had learnt that pulling the “ON” tray lead to the bait,
while pulling the “OFF” tray did not. Authai chose the
correct tray in seven trials out of her Wrst ten trials
(Fig. 4b).
Condition C. Authai performed the task signiWcantly
better than chance in the Wrst block (66% correct, bino-
mial test: P = 0.0328), and reached criterion in the sec-
ond block (78% correct, binomial test: P = 0.0003).
Authai chose the correct stimuli in six trials out of her
Wrst ten trials. In contrast, although Surya chose the
correct stimuli in nine trials out of her Wrst ten trials,
Surya performed the task below the signiWcance level
in the Wrst and second blocks (60 and 62% correct,
respectively, binomial test: P > 0.1. See Fig. 4c). The
lower performance of Surya might indicate a low level
of motivation, and it was decided not to continue the
experiments with Surya. Taken together, these Wndings
suggest that one of the two elephants was able to trans-
fer the knowledge obtained under Condition B and
apply it to Condition C. The average correct percentage
of Authai was 71.1% and Surya was 61.9% throughout
the task.
Condition D. The Wnal task was conducted only by
Authai, who scored above chance level in the Wrst
block (66% correct, binomial test: P = 0.0328). She
chose the correct stimuli in eight trials out of her Wrst
ten trials (Fig. 4d). Moreover, she reached criterion in
the second block (80% correct, binomial test,
P < 0.0001). These Wndings suggest that this elephant
was able to understand the spatial relationship between
the tray and the bait correctly and rapidly, and that she
learnt to pull the uninterrupted tray rather than the tray
with the gap.
Discussion
In this study elephants were introduced to tasks from two
diVerent categories; Wrst, in the “on–oV” task, subjects had
to understand the spatial relationship between the tray and
the bait. The food had to be on and connected to the surface
of the tray for the tray to serve as an eVective tool to draw
food within the subjects’ reach. Second, to solve the “con-
nectedness” problem, subjects had to learn that the food
had to be on and connected to the surface of a single unin-
terrupted tray instead of on a tray with a horizontal gap,
thus making this problem more complicated than the “on–
oV” problem (Hauser et al. 1999).
It is probable that the results reXect an understanding of
means–end relationships and not a mere discrimination
Fig. 3 The percentage of correct trials per block (50 trials). A perfor-
mance was considered signiWcantly better than chance if >66% of trials
was correct (33 of 50 trials; binomial test, P = 0.0328)
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ability: Authai and Surya were both able to perform above
chance level within 50 trials and in contrast, Rensch (1957)
reported that the elephant required 330 trials to compare
two visual stimuli and choose the correct one. Thus, if our
subjects were merely referring to the visual aspect of the
stimuli and making a mere visual discrimination, they
would have required more trials to complete the tasks.
The elephants’ performances were strikingly diVerent
from each other. While Authai accomplished all four tasks,
Surya was only able to successfully complete the tasks
under Conditions A and B. Moreover, in the latter condi-
tion, she was much slower than Authai. Considering the
fact that food was not deprived this might have resulted in
low motivation levels.
Authai’s average performance varied between diVerent
conditions and blocks. In the Wrst block of Condition A, she
would earn the reward regardless of how many times she
had pulled a tray within a trial, but in the second block,
where she was allowed to choose only once per trial, she
had to act correctly to earn the reward. The percentage of
correct trials was higher in all the sessions of training two
than training one except once.
Authai scored above 66% in the Wrst blocks of
Conditions C and D, and she was correct in six trials out of
her  Wrst ten trials for Condition C and eight trials for
Condition D. This suggests that transfer of learning
occurred from Condition B. Moreover, her score did not
drop during the shift from Condition B to C, indicating that
she understood that the color and size of the tray made no
diVerence to solving the problem. In addition, her score
did not drop during the shift from Condition C to D. The
similar performance in Conditions C and D suggests that
either the diVerent diYculty levels of the tasks were not
reXected in Authai’s performance, or that she considered
the “on–oV” task and the “connectedness” tasks to be iden-
tical. Perhaps she considered Condition D as another “on–
oV” task. When she was shown the trays in the “connected-
ness” task (Condition D), after she had learnt the “on–oV”
rule in Conditions B and C, she only looked at those trays
that she could draw closer with her trunk.
Thus, there were two diVerent negative stimuli in the
experiment: one was the tray on which the food was placed
but where she was unable to grab it (Condition D), and the
second one was a tray with no food at all (Conditions B and
C). The positive stimulus in all conditions was of course the
tray containing the bait. Thus, in each task she compared
the tray without available food (the negative stimulus) with
the positive stimulus. Using this rule, Authai may have
solved the “on–oV” problem. It is true that Condition D was
more complicated than the previous conditions, as she had
to know which of the two trays could be drawn closer.
However, the rule necessary to solve the problem was the
same as that for Conditions B and C, namely the “on–oV”
rule. Further experiments are necessary to investigate
whether such transfer of learning actually occurred and
future experiments will require a higher number of subjects
if Wrm conclusions are to be drawn.
Overall, the elephants’ performance was rather poor
compared to that of nonhuman primates; chimpanzees are
able to solve this kind of tasks spontaneously (Povinelli
et al. 2000) and tamarins are able to learn the solution more
rapidly than do elephants and their performances clearly
Fig. 4 The change in number of 
correct trials each day (10 trials). 
a Depicts the number of correct 
trials of Condition A, b Condi-
tion B, c Condition C, and 
d Condition D, respectively
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show that their learning was transferred between diVerent
types of tools (Hauser et al. 1999, 2002). Certainly, to draw
conclusion of the elephants’ ability of means–end behavior,
experiments with more subjects and more systematically
varied conditions need to be done. Also, controlling sub-
jects’ motivation levels is another important problem to be
solved. The performances of our subjects were not as good
as the nonhuman primates of the previous studies. From our
results, our subjects seem to be able to solve the means–end
task by empirical learning and not spontaneously. How-
ever, we found it diYcult to keep the elephants concen-
trated to the task, which might have aVected their
performance and failed to monitor the accurate learning
speed of our subjects. In addition, their limited vision must
be taken into account in future studies. Their visual acuity
may not be as good as that of primates, although this issue
also remains to be addressed.
However, with limitations, this study provides important
information that would hint the researchers who plan to run
experiments with elephants. Since the study by Rensch
(1957), almost no attempt was made to study captive ele-
phants under controlled environments except for the few
studies on their mirror self recognition (Povinelli 1989;
Plotnik et al. 2006) and some limitedly controlled experi-
ments by Nissani and his colleagues (Nissani et al. 2005;
Nissani 2006). This study has shown that elephants are suit-
able subjects to directly compare their cognition and intelli-
gence with nonhuman primates, and that likely in various
cognitive tasks.
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